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We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convert-
ibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin),
and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction of better-response dynamics
will converge to a Nash equilibrium in quadratic (finite) time. Convergence happens on a
per-player basis, and even in the presence of players with cyclic preferences, the players with
acyclic preferences will stabilize. Thus, we obtain a candidate notion for rationality in the
presence of irrational agents. Moreover, the restriction of convertibility can be justified by a
conservative updating of beliefs about the other players strategies.
For infinite games in extensive form we can retain convergence to a Nash equilibrium
(in some sense), if the preferences are given by continuous payoff functions; or obtain a
transfinite convergence if the outcome sets of the game are ∆0
2
-sets.
1 Introduction
The Nash equilibria are the fixed points of the better (or best) response dynamics. In graph
theory they would be called the sinks of these dynamics, in computer science they may be
called their terminal strategy profiles. In general these dynamics do not terminate, i.e. the
corresponding binary relations over strategy profiles are not well-founded. In finite games it
amounts to the existence of a cycle.
A particular exception is found in potential games [24]: A potential is an acyclic relation
over the profiles that includes all the player (i.e. individual) better-response dynamics. In a
potential game, better-response dynamics thus will always improve the potential, and hence
terminates (at a Nash equilibrium) if the game is finite.
The notion of semi-potential was introduced by Kukushkin ([13], also [14]) in order to
salvage some of the nice properties of potential games for a larger class of games. Here, each
player’s freedom to change strategies is restricted – however, only in such a way that if she
could change the current outcome to a particular outcome in the absence of restriction, she
can still do so in a way that is consistent with the restriction. In a generic normal form game
this is equivalent to a potential, as there different strategies will induce different outcomes.
Nevertheless, several classes of non-generic games have no potential but have a semi-potential:
[13, Theorem 3] proved that it is the case for finite real-valued games in extensive form.
In this article we study Kukushkin’s restriction of the convertibility relation (we call it lazy
convertibility) as well as the resulting better-response dynamics (lazy improvement) in some more
detail. We give two alternative proofs of the termination at a Nash equilibrium in finite games,
one of which yields a tight quadratic bound on the number of steps required. Moreover, our two
proofs of termination work on a per player basis: Thus, each player with acyclic preference will
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terminate, even in the presence of players with cyclic preferences. Then we extend these results
to infinite games in extensive form in several ways. A very specific infinite setting was already
explored in [4], and lazy improvement in infinite games in extensive form with continuous payoff
functions was investigated by the authors in [18].
Some relevant properties of the lazy improvement are:
• The dynamics are uncoupled: Each player bases her decisions on her own preference, but
she does not need to know the other players’ preferences.
• The dynamics are history-independent: Unlike e.g. fictitious play or typical regret-minimization
approaches (e.g. [11]), the next step in the dynamics depends only on the current strategies
of the players. In particular, players do not need memory for learning.
• We consider pure strategies, not stochastic ones. Thus, our approach has a very different
flavour from the usual evolutionary game theory one (e.g. [7, 6, 31]).
• No restrictions akin to generic payoffs are required, we merely need acyclic preferences to
guarantee termination at a Nash equilibrium in finite games (and anyway this requirement
cannot be avoided for existence of Nash equilibrium [15, 16]).
• In a finite game with acyclic preferences, the dynamics stabilizes at a Nash equilibrium
after a quadratic number of steps.
• The stabilization result for the rational players, i.e. with acyclic preferences, remains
unaffected, if unpredictable players, i.e. with cyclic preferences, are added.
• Under some conditions, even in an infinite game in extensive form we can ensure stabiliza-
tion at a Nash equilibrium after a transfinite number of steps.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls the definitions of game in
normal form, game in extensive form, and the better-response dynamics. Section 3 introduces
the core concept of lazy improvement. Section 4 proves that in a finite game, lazy improvement
terminates at a Nash equilibrium. Section 4.2 gives an alternative proof also showing that
termination occurs after a quadratic number of improvement steps. Section 5 gives a basic
epistemic justification for lazy convertibility. In Section 6 we discuss extensions to infinite
games. Finally, Section 7 provides a number of (counter)examples showing that, to some extent,
our definitions have to be the way they are. An extended abstract based on this work is [21].
Subsection 6.2 is based on [18, Section VI].
2 Background and Notation
This section recalls the definitions of game in normal form, game in extensive form, and the
better-response dynamics.
Definition 1. A game in normal form is a tuple 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 satisfying the fol-
lowing:
• A is a non-empty set (of players, or agents),
•
∏
a∈A Sa is a non-empty Cartesian product (whose elements are the strategy profiles and
where Sa represents the strategies available to Player a),
• O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes),
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• v :
∏
a∈A Sa → O (the outcome function that values the strategy profiles),
• Each ≺a is a binary relation over O (modelling the preference of Player a).
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). Let 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game in normal form.
A strategy profile (profile for short) s in S :=
∏
a∈A Sa is a Nash equilibrium if it makes every
Player a stable, i.e. v(s) 6≺a v(s
′) for all s′ ∈ S that differ from s at most at the a-component.
NE(s) := ∀a ∈ A,∀s′ ∈ S, ¬(v(s) ≺a v(s
′) ∧ ∀b ∈ A− {a}, sb = s
′
b)
Implicit in the concept of Nash equilibrium is the notion of convertibility : An agent can
convert one strategy profile to another, if they differ only in her actions. As lazy improvement
will be introduced in Section 3 by restricting the convertibility relation, we provide a formal
definition:
Definition 3 (Convertibility, induced preference over profiles, and improvement).
• Let 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game in normal form. For s, s
′ ∈
∏
a∈A Sa, let s
c
։a s
′
denote the ability of Player a to convert s to s′ by changing her own strategy, formally
s
c
։a s
′ := ∀b ∈ A− {a}, sb = s
′
b.
• Given a game 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉, let s ≺a s
′ denote v(s) ≺a v(s
′). So in this
article ≺a may also refer to the induced preference over the profiles.
• Let ։a :=≺a ∩
c
։a be the individual improvement relations of the players and let ։ :=
∪a∈A ։a be the better-response dynamics.
Observation 4 below is a direct consequence of Definitions 2 and 3.
Observation 4. The Nash equilibria of a game are exactly the sinks, i.e., the terminal profiles
of the better-response dynamics ։.
A (generalized) potential is an acyclic relation containing ։. Clearly a game has a potential
iff ։ is acyclic. If
∏
a∈A Sa is finite, this is equivalent to the termination of the better-response
dynamics. A less restrictive notion is a semi-potential (introduced in [13]). A semi-potential is
an acyclic relation →֒ contained in ։, such that whenever s ։ s′ then there is some s′′ with
s →֒ s′′ and v(s) = v(s′′). In words, if a strategy profile can be reached by an improvement
step, there is an equivalent strategy profile (w.r.t the induced outcome) reachable via a step
in the semi-potential. It follows that the sinks of a semi-potential are exactly the sinks of the
better-response dynamics. Thus, in a finite setting, the existence of a semi-potential in particular
implies the existence of sinks, i.e. Nash equilibria.
Our setting will be games in extensive form, rather than games in normal form. The idea
here is that the players collectively choose a path through a tree, with each player deciding the
direction at the vertices that she is controlling. The preferences refer only to the path created,
choices off the chosen path are irrelevant. Thus, the evaluation map v is highly non-injective,
which in turn gives room for the notion of a semi-potential to be interesting. Formally, we define
games in extensive form as follows:
Definition 5. A game in extensive form is a tuple (A,T,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A) where
• A is the non-empty set of players,
• T is a rooted tree (finite or infinite),
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• O is the non-empty set of outcomes,
• d associates a player with each vertex in the tree,
• v associates an outcome with each maximal path from the root through the tree,
• and for each Player a ∈ A, ≺a is a relation on O (the preference relation of a).
The corresponding game in normal form is obtained as follows: Let a strategy of Player a
associate an outgoing edge with each vertex controlled by a. If a strategy per player is given,
the collective choices identify some maximal path p through the tree, called the induced play.
Applying v to that path yields the outcome of the game; i.e. the valuation of the game in normal
form is the composition of the map that identifies the induced play and the valuation of the
game in extensive form.
In our concrete examples, the outcomes will be tuples of natural numbers, and the n-th
player will prefer a tuple (x1, . . . , x|A|) to (y1, . . . , y|A|) iff xn > yn.
3 Defining lazy improvement
The idea underlying lazy improvement is that we do not let a player change their irrelevant
choices, i.e. those choices not along the play induced after the improvement. Equivalently, we
require a player to change as few choices as possible when changing the induced play.
Definition 6 (Lazy convertibility and improvement).
• For two strategy profiles s, s′ in a game in extensive form let s
c
⇀a s
′ (read: Player a can
lazily convert s into s′), if for every vertex t ∈ T , if s(t) 6= s′(t), then d(t) = a and t lies
along the play induced by s′. Let
c
⇀:= ∪a∈A
c
⇀a.
• Let ⇀a :=≺a ∩
c
⇀a be the lazy improvement of Player a and let ⇀ := ∪a∈A ⇀a be the
lazy better-response dynamics, or lazy improvement.
Let us exemplify the notion of lazy convertibility, which has nothing to do with the prefer-
ences or the outcomes: Player a can lazily convert the leftmost strategy profile below into each
of the profiles below, but not into any other profile. Strategy choices are represented by double
lines in the pictures, e.g. Player a chooses left instead of right at each node of the leftmost
profile. Also for each other profile, Player a is written bold face at nodes where the profile differ
from the leftmost one.
a
a a
a
a a
a
a a
a
a a
Contrary to the convertibility relations
c
։a which are equivalence relations, the lazy convertibility
relations
c
⇀a are certainly reflexive but in general neither symmetric nor transitive. For instance,
Player a cannot lazily convert the rightmost profile above back into the leftmost one. In the
additional example below, Player a can convert the leftmost profile to the middle profile but not
to the rightmost profile.
a
a
a a
a
a a
a
a
a a
a
a a
a
a
a a
a
a a
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Since several forthcoming proofs invoke induction over the tree structure of the games, we
note below that lazy convertibility could also be defined inductively.
Observation 7. The inductive definition below is equivalent to Definition 6.
• If s is a leaf profile, let us define s
c
⇀a s for all a ∈ A.
• Let two profiles s and s′ have the profiles s0, . . . , sn and s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n as respective children.
Let Player a choose si at the root of s and s
′
k at the root of s
′ and assume that sj = s
′
j for
j 6= k. If sk
c
⇀b s
′
k and if b = a or i = k, let us define s
c
⇀b s
′.
The lazy convertibility enjoys a useful property that the usual convertibility does not: if a
player changes a play p into another play during a sequence of lazy convertibility, only the very
same player might be later able to make the last step to induce p again, possibly induced by a
different profile. This phenomenon is more formally stated by Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. If s
c
⇀a s0
c
⇀ · · ·
c
⇀ sn
c
⇀b s
′ where s and s′ induce the same play, and if this play
is different from the plays that are induced by the si, then a = b.
Proof. Let us prove the claim by induction on the underlying game. Since the play induced by
s0 is different from the play induced by s, these profiles are not just leaves, but proper trees
instead. During the assumed
c
⇀ reduction of s, its subprofile that is chosen by the root owner
in s undergoes a
c
⇀ reduction too, say t
c
⇀a t0
c
⇀ · · ·
c
⇀ tn
c
⇀b t
′, where t and t′ induce the
same play (and the root owner chooses t′ in s′). If all these subprofiles are equal, Player a must
be the root owner (of s), since s and s0 induce different plays by assumption, and b is also the
root owner since sn and s
′ induce different plays, so a = b. Now let tj be the first subprofile
different from t, so tj induces a play different from t and t
′. For all k such that j ≤ k < n, if tk
and t′ induce different plays but tk+1 and t
′ induce the same play, then sk+1 and s
′ induce the
same play by definition of
c
⇀, contradiction with the assumptions of the lemma, so all tj, . . . tn
induce plays different from that of t′. If t1 6= t, then a = b by the induction hypothesis, else
a must be the root owner and does not choose t1 in s1. The first time that a chooses some ti
again must be in sj: indeed if it were before, s and si would induce the same play, and if it were
after, a could not change tj−1 into tj. Therefore tj−1
c
⇀a tj
c
⇀ · · ·
c
⇀ tn
c
⇀b t
′ and a = b by the
induction hypothesis.
Observation 9 below shows that despite the restrictive property from Lemma 8, the lazy
convertibility is as effective as the usual convertibility, in the same sense as used in the definition
of a semi-potential. (Thus, it will only remain to prove that lazy improvement is acyclic in order
to establish lazy improvement as a semi-potential).
Observation 9. If s։ s′, there is some strategy profile s′′ such that s ⇀ s′′ and v(s′) = v(s′′).
Proof. By definition, lazy convertibility does not restrict the choice of the new induced play,
merely the ability to alter the strategy off the new induced play.
Corollary 10. The Nash equilibria of a game are exactly the terminal profiles of the lazy im-
provement ⇀.
6 Lazy improvement and Nash equilibrium
4 Termination in finite games
This section presents two proofs. The first proof consists in showing acyclicity of the lazy
improvement by contradiction, which carries over to infinite games. The second proof is closer
to the original proof of [13], and it yields tight bounds on the number of lazy improvement steps
occurring before termination.
4.1 First proof, by contradiction
Theorem 11. Consider a game in extensive form played on a finite tree, and some sequence
(sn)n∈N such that sn ⇀ sn+1 for all n ∈ N. Assume that for a Player a there are infinitely many
n with sn ⇀a sn+1. Then a has a cyclic preference.
Proof. Towards a contradiction let us assume that a’s preference is acyclic. Among the profiles
s such that s = sn ⇀a sn+1 for infinitely many n, let s be minimal for a’s preference, and let M
be large enough such that every profile sn with M < n occurs infinitely often in the sequence.
Let s = sn for some n > M , and let k > n be the least k such that sn and sk induce the same
play. Lemma 8 implies that sk−1 ⇀a sk, so Player a prefers the outcome of sn over that of sk−1,
contradiction.
Together with Corollary 10 the following corollary shows the equivalence between all prefer-
ences being acyclic and universal existence of NE.
Corollary 12. Consider outcomes O, players A, and their preferences (≺a)a∈A: All ≺a are
acyclic iff for all finite games in extensive form built from O, A and (≺a)a∈A the lazy better-
response dynamics terminates.
Proof. The difficult implication of the equivalence is a corollary of Theorem 11. For the other
implication, note that if x0 ≺a x1 ≺a · · · ≺a xn ≺a x0, then ⇀a does not terminate on the
profile below.
a
x0 x1 ... xn
Corollary 13 (Kukushkin). In a finite game in extensive form where every player has acyclic
preferences, lazy improvement is a semi-potential.
Proof. Combine Corollary 10 and Corollary 12.
Kukushkin ([13, Theorem 3]) proved Corollary 13 in the case where the preferences are
derived from payoffs. In this specific (yet usual) setting, it is not possible to consider players
with cyclic preferences, so Theorem 11 or Corollary 12 cannot even be stated.
Based on Corollary 12 we obtain a reasonable candidate for rational behaviour in games in
extensive form played with an unpredictable nature or erratic players: Perform lazy improvement
until the players with acyclic preferences no longer change their strategies. It is always consistent
with the observations to assume that the changes in another player’s strategy are based on lazy
convertibility. This argument is explored in more detail in Section 5. Nature can then be
modelled as a player with the full relation as preferences, such that any convertible step for
nature becomes an improvement step.
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4.2 Second proof, with bounds
The proof of Theorem 11, by contradiction, gives a quick argument but no deep insight on how
and how fast the relation terminates. A stronger statement can proven by using the multiset of
outcomes avoided by a Player a (i.e. the outcomes obtained in a subgame, where the decision
not to play into that subgame was made by a, see Definition 14) to construct a measure that will
decrease on any lazy improvement step by a (Lemma 17), and remain unchanged by any lazy
convertibility step by a different player (Lemma 16). Thus, we are in a situation very similar to
potential games [24] – however, in a potential game a player can increase the potential (which
is common to all the players) but does not want to, whereas here the players cannot impact the
measure of another player as long as they are restricted to lazy convertibility.
Definition 14 (Avoided outcomes of a game and of a profile). The avoided outcomes of a game
g is a function ∆(g) of type A→ N, and it is defined inductively below.
• ∆(g, a) := 0 if g is a leaf game.
• If Player a owns the root of a game g whose children are g0, . . . , gn then
– ∆(g, b) :=
∑n
j=0∆(gj , b) for all b 6= a.
– ∆(g, a) :=
(∑n
j=0∆(gj , a)
)
+ n
The avoided outcomes of a profile s is a function δ(s) of type A → O → N, or equivalently
in this case, of type A×O → N, and it is defined inductively below.
• δ(s, a, o) := 0 if s is a leaf profile.
• If Player a owns the root of a profile s and chooses the subprofile si among s0, . . . , sn then
– δ(s, b, o) :=
∑n
j=0 δ(sj , b, o) for all b 6= a.
– δ(s, a, o) :=
(∑n
j=0 δ(sj , a, o)
)
+ |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} | v(sj) = o}|
The smaller array below describes the function ∆(g), where g is the underlying game of the
left-hand profile s below, and the right-hand array describes the function δ(s). For instance
δ(s, b, y) = 2 because Player b avoids the outcome y twice: once at the left-most internal node,
after two leftward moves, when choosing outcome x rather than y, and also once after one
rightward move, also when choosing x rather than y. Note that the only leaf that is not accounted
for by the function of the avoided outcome of a profile/game is the leaf that is induced by the
profile.
a
b
b
x y
a
z t
b
a
x t t
a
y z
∆(g, ·)
a 7→ 5
b 7→ 3
δ(s, ·, ·) x y z t
a 1 0 1 3
b 0 2 1 0
Observation 15 below relates the two functions from Definition 14. It refers to s2g, a function
that returns the underlying game of a given profile, see [15] or [16] for a proper definition.
Observation 15. 1. Let s be a profile and a be a player, then ∆(s2g(s), a) =
∑
o∈O δ(s, a, o).
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2. Let g be a game, then 1 +
∑
a∈A∆(g, a) equals the number of leaves of g.
Proof. 1. By induction on s. If s is a leaf profile, the claim holds since ∆(s2g(s), a) =
0 = δ(s, a, o) by definition, so now let s be a profile where the root owner a chooses si
among subprofiles s0, . . . , sn. For b 6= a Definition 14 and the induction hypothesis yield
∆(s2g(s), b) =
∑n
j=0∆(s2g(sj), b)
I.H.
=
∑n
j=0
∑
0∈O δ(sj , b, o) =
∑
0∈O
∑n
j=0 δ(sj , b, o) =∑
0∈O δ(s, b, o). Similarly we have ∆(s2g(s), a) =
∑n
j=0∆(s2g(sj), a)+n
I.H.
=
∑n
j=0
∑
o∈O δ(sj , a, o)+
|{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} | v(sj) ∈ O}| =∑
o∈O
(∑n
j=0 δ(sj , a, o) + |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} | v(sj) = o}|
)
=
∑
o∈O δ(s, a, o).
2. By induction on g. This holds for every leaf game g since ∆(g, a) = 0 by definition. Let g be
a game whose root is owned by Player a and whose subgames are g0, . . . , gn. The number of
leaves in g is the sum of the numbers of leaves in the gj , that is,
∑n
j=0
(
1+
∑
b∈A∆(gj , b)
)
by induction hypothesis. This, equals 1 +
∑n
j=0
∑
b∈A−{a}∆(gj , b) + n +
∑n
j=0∆(gj , a),
which, in turn, equals 1 +
∑
b∈A−{a}∆(g, b) + ∆(g, a) by definition.
Lemma 16 below states conservation of the outcomes that are avoided by a player in a profile
during a lazy convertibility step of another player. Intuitively, it is because a lazy convertibility
step of a player cannot modify the subtrees that are avoided by the other players, even though
she owns node therein. In the lemma and after δ(s, b) denotes o 7→ δ(s, b, o)
Lemma 16. s
c
⇀a s
′ ∧ b 6= a ⇒ δ(s, b) = δ(s′, b)
Proof. By induction on the profile. It holds for leaves, so let s
c
⇀a s
′ with subprofiles s0, . . . , sn
and s′0, . . . , s
′
n, respectively. By definition of
c
⇀a we have sj
c
⇀a s
′
j for all j, and therefore
δ(sj , b, o) = δ(s
′
j , b, o) by induction hypothesis. If the root owner is different from b, then
δ(s, b, o) =
∑n
j=0 δ(sj , b, o) =
∑n
j=0 δ(s
′
j , b, o) = δ(s
′, b, o) by definition of δ. If b is the root
owner, she chooses the i-th subprofile in both s and s′ since b 6= a, and moreover s′j = sj for
all j distinct from i. So δ(s, b, o) =
∑n
j=0 δ(sj , b, o) + |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} | v(sj) = o}| =∑n
j=0 δ(s
′
j , b, o) + |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} | v(s
′
j) = o}| = δ(s
′, b, o).
However, the conservation does not fully hold for the player who converts the profile, unless
the induced outcomes are the same for both profiles. The difference is little though, only
depending on both induced outcomes. In Lemma 17 below, eq is just a boolean representation
of equality: eq(x, x) := 1 and eq(x, y) := 0 for x 6= y.
Lemma 17. s
c
⇀a s
′ ⇒ δ(s, a) + eq(v(s)) = δ(s′, a) + eq(v(s′))
Proof. By induction on the profile s. It holds for leaves, so let s
c
⇀a s
′ with subprofiles s0, . . . , sn
and s′0, . . . , s
′
n, respectively. If the root owner is distinct from a, she chooses the same i-th sub-
profile in both s and s′, therefore δ(s, a, o) + eq(v(s), o) =
∑
0≤j≤n∧ j 6=i δ(sj , a, o) + δ(si, a, o) +
eq(v(si), o) =
∑
0≤j≤n∧ j 6=i δ(s
′
j , a, o) + δ(s
′
i, a, o) + eq(v(s
′
i), o) = δ(s
′, a, o) + eq(v(s′), o) by defi-
nition of δ, since sj = s
′
j for j 6= i, and by induction hypothesis.
If a is the root owner, let a choose the i-th and k-th subprofiles in s and s′, respectively.
Let N := δ(s, a, o) + eq(v(s), o), so N =
∑n
0≤j≤n∧ j 6=k δ(s
′
j , a, o) + |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {i} |
v(sj) = o}| + δ(sk, a, o) + eq(v(si), o) by unfolding Definition 14, since s
′
j = sj for all j 6= k,
and since v(s) = v(si) by the choice at the root. Rewriting N twice with the easy-to-check
equality |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} − {x} | v(sj) = o}| + eq(v(sx), o) = |{j ∈ {0, . . . , n} | v(sj) = o}|,
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first with x := i and then with x := k yields the equality N =
∑n
0≤j≤n∧ j 6=k δ(s
′
j , a, o) + |{j ∈
{0, . . . , n} − {k} | v(sj) = o}| + δ(sk, a, o) + eq(v(sk), o). Since sk
c
⇀a s
′
k by definition of lazy
convertibility, and by the induction hypothesis, let us further rewrite δ(sk, a) + eq(v(sk)) with
δ(s′k, a) + eq(v(s
′
k)) in N . Folding Definition 14 yields N = δ(s
′, a, o) + eq(v(s′), o).
The two lemmas above suggest that whenever a player lazily converts a profile to obtain
a better outcome, some measure decreases a bit with respect to her preference, but does not
change for the other players. The lazy improvement should therefore terminate, and even quite
quickly, as proved below. Recall that a finite preference relation ≺ has height at most h if there
is no chain s1 ≺ s2 ≺ . . . ≺ sh+1.
Theorem 18 (Strengthening Theorem 11 with bounds). Consider a game g where Player a has
an acyclic preference of height h. Let ∆(g, a) be the total number of choices available to Player
a, minus the number of vertices where a is choosing. Then in any sequence (possibly infinite) of
lazy improvement, the number of lazy improvement steps performed by Player a is bounded by
(h− 1) ·∆(g, a).
Proof. For every outcome o let h(a, o) be the maximal cardinality of the ≺a-chains whose ≺a-
maximum is o, and note that o ≺a o
′ implies h(a, o) < h(a, o′). For every profile s let M(s, a) :=∑
o∈O(h(a, o)− 1) · δ(s, a, o) and note that 0 ≤M(s, a) ≤ (h− 1) ·∆(g, a) by Observation 15.1.
Let s ⇀a s
′ be a lazy improvement step, so s
c
⇀a s
′ and v(s) ≺a v(s
′) by definition, then
M(s, a) −M(s′, a) =
∑
o∈O(h(a, o) − 1) · (δ(s, a, o) − δ(s
′, a, o)) = h(a, v(s′)) − h(a, v(s)) > 0
by Lemma 17. Let s
c
⇀b s
′ be a lazy convertibility step where b 6= a, then M(s, a) = M(s′, a)
by Lemma 16. This shows that the ⇀a steps are at most (h − 1) ·∆(g, a) in every sequence of
⇀.
Corollary 19 (Strengthen Corollary 12 with bounds). The lazy improvement terminates for all
games iff all preferences are acyclic, in which case the number of sequential lazy improvement
steps is at most (h− 1) · (l− 1) where h bounds the cardinality of the preference chains and l is
the number of leaves.
Observation 20. 1. The maximal length of a lazy improvement sequence is bounded in a
quadratic manner in the size of the game in general and linearly when h from Corollary 19
is fixed.
2. The quadratic and linear bounds are tight.
Proof. (of 20.2.) For the linear bound, let us consider the figure below and set x := x0 = · · · = xn
and y ≺a x and x ≺b y. There is clearly a lazy improvement sequence starting from the figure
and visiting each leaf exactly once.
a
b
x0 y
b
x1 y
. . . b
xn y
It is similar for the quadratic bound, but we need to be a bit more careful. For n ∈ N, consider
the game in the above figure, where y ≺a x0 ≺a x1 · · · ≺a xn and xi ≺b y for all i. Let us prove
by induction on n the existence of a sequence of (n+2)(n+3)2 − 2 lazy improvement steps when
starting from the strategy profile above. For the base case n = 0, there are 1 = (0+2)(0+3)2 − 2
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lazy improvement steps. For the inductive case, let Player a make n lazy improvements in a
row, by choosing x1, then x2, and so on until xn. At that point, let Player b improve from
xn to y and then let Player a come back to x0. So far, n + 2 lazy improvement steps have
been performed. Now let us ignore the substrategy profile involving xn (and y). By induction
hypothesis, (n+1)(n+2)2 − 2 additional lazy improvement steps can be performed in a row. Since
(n+ 2) + (n+1)(n+2)2 − 2 =
(n+2)(n+3)
2 − 2, we are done.
4.3 Lazy non-worsening
In this section the outcomes are real-valued payoff tuples. In this case, Theorem 18 can be slightly
generalized in a way that will prove useful for studying lazy improvement in infinite games in
Subsection 6.3. Let a lazy non-worsening step be a lazy convertibility step that does not decrease
the payoff of the converting player. Said otherwise, a lazy non-worsening step is either a lazy
improvement step or a lazy convertibility step preserving the payoff of the converting player. As
shown below, weakening the first (but not the second) ”lazy improvement” in Theorem 18 into
a ”lazy non-worsening” still yields a correct statement.
Definition 21 (Non-worsening). Let fa be the payoff function of Player a, and let s  a s
′ if
fa(s) = fa(s
′) ∧ s
c
⇀a s
′. Let  := ∪a∈A  a be the lazy preservation and let ⇀ ∪ be the lazy
non-worsening.
Theorem 22 (Strengthen Theorem 11). Consider a game g with real-valued payoffs, where
Player a has at most h different payoffs. Then in every sequence (possibly infinite) of lazy
non-worsening, the number of lazy improvement steps performed by Player a is bounded by
(h− 1) ·∆(g, a).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 18. We modify δ from Definition 14 to take
payoffs into account instead of outcomes/payoff tuples. A modification of Lemma 17 is then
easily obtained. Now, the old M(s, a) form the proof of Theorem 18 is re-defined with the new
δ. We should additionally point out that a lazy preservation step preserves the new M(s, a), by
the new Lemma 17. Thus, lazy preservation steps preserve M , and have therefore no impact on
the termination argument for the lazy improvement steps.
Corollary 23. Let us restrict the lazy non-worsening such that preservation steps may only
occur if the current profile is a NE. Every infinite sequence of such a restricted non-worsening
is eventually made only of NE.
Note that there is no bound on when at the latest the lazy improvement steps may occur in
Corollary 23, as the following example shows:
Example 24. We consider a game with two players, a and b, and two payoff tuples, x and y
such that y ≺a x and x ≺b y. The game tree and initial strategy profile are as follows:
a
x x b
x y
Player a can alternate between his left-most and center choice as often as he wishes using
lazy equilibrium preservation. He can also at any time change to his right-most choice. Then
Player b has the opportunity to a lazy improvement step by changing to y, whereupon Player a
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can lazily improve by going back to the left-most or center choice to obtain the outcome x. After
this happened, all remaining possible lazy non-worsening steps are Player a alternating between
the left-most and center choice.
Lemma 25 below will be used with Theorem 22 to deal with lazy improvement in infinite
games in Section 6.
Lemma 25. Let (gn)n∈N be a family of finite games in extensive form that differ only in pay-
offs and that converge towards some game g when n approaches infinity. Consider an infinite
sequence of profiles (sn)n∈N such that sn(⇀ ∪  )sn+1 in gn. Then there is some k ∈ N such
that for all n ≥ k we have that sn(⇀ ∪ )sn+1 in g.
Proof. As lazy convertibility does not refer to the payoffs, we see that any lazy convertibility
step in one of the gn is also a lazy convertibility step in g. We only need to argue about the
improvement and preservation aspects.
Let δ be the minimum distance between different payoffs in g. We pick k ∈ N such that for
all n ≥ k the difference between payoffs in gn and g at the same leaf is less than
δ
4 for all leaves.
In particular, we find that in gn for n ≥ k payoffs differing by less than
δ
2 correspond to identical
payoffs in g, payoffs differing by at least δ2 correspond to different payoffs in g.
Any lazy improvement step in gn for n ≥ k that improves the payoff of the acting player by
at least δ2 is a lazy improvement step in g. Any lazy improvement step in gn for n ≥ k that
improves the payoff of the acting player by less than δ2 corresponds to a preservation step in g,
and so do preservation steps in gn.
5 Lazy convertibility as belief updating
Let us discuss whether we should expect players to conform to lazy convertibility when playing
a sequential game repeatedly. Observation 9 tells us that in the short term, a player has no
incentive to deviate from lazy convertibility: If she desires some outcome she can reach by some
deviation from her current strategy, she can obtain this outcome by converting a strategy in
a lazy way. There is a caveat, though, in that restricting convertibility to lazy convertibility
changes the overall reachability structure, as the following example shows.
Example 26. The last profile of the three-step improvement relation below is a Nash equilibrium
that cannot be reached from the first profile under lazy improvement.
a
b
a
3, 3 0, 0
0, 0
b
2, 2 1, 1
a
b
a
3, 3 0, 0
0, 0
b
2, 2 1, 1
a
b
a
3, 3 0, 0
0, 0
b
2, 2 1, 1
a
b
a
3, 3 0, 0
0, 0
b
2, 2 1, 1
From the perspective of any given player, it however makes a lot of sense to assume that all
other players are updating their own strategies only in a lazy way – assuming that only relevant
choices of the other players can be observed. The latter seems to be crucial in order to make the
game truly sequential: If all players announced their entire strategy simultaneously, it would be
a game in normal form after all.
To formalize this idea, let us fix a Player a and consider the game from her perspective. She
may consider the game as a two-player game played by her against all other players aggregated
12 Lazy improvement and Nash equilibrium
into a single Player b. She starts with some initial strategy s
(0)
a , and some prior assumption s
(0)
b
on the strategy of her opponent(s). She then updates her own strategy via lazy improvement
to s
(1)
a . Then the game is actually played, and Player a observes the actual moves (but not the
strategy) of her opponents. As she only observes the moves along the path actually taken, it is
consistent with her observations to assume that the aggregated opponent player lazily converted
s
(0)
b into some s
(1)
b . Then the Player a again performs a lazy improvement step to s
(2)
a , plays the
game, etc. Provided that the Player a has acyclic preferences, Theorem 11 implies that her own
strategy stabilizes to some strategy sa eventually.
This learning procedure is the deterministic counterpart to the rational learning proposed by
Kalai and Lehrer [8], and extended to define the self-confirming equilibria by Fudenberg and
Levine [8]1. Wellman and Hu’s conjectural equilibria [30] are based on the same intuition
underlying the learning procedure – only actual actions are observed, not hypothetical ones,
which are merely subject to conjecture.
Note that this procedure requires no assumptions on knowledge of rationality of other players
or their payoff functions, not to speak of common knowledge. There is in general no reason to
assume that the aggregated Player b acts according to some acyclic preference (given that the
different players making up b may have partially antagonistic preferences). However, if each
player has an acyclic preference and performs the same procedure as a above, then each players
actual strategy will stabilize. As any change in what a player assumes her aggregated opponents
are playing has to be caused by either a change in her own, or someone else’s strategy, this
implies that also the believed strategy of the aggregated players sb will stabilize. Furthermore,
all the strategy profiles constructed in this way induce the same play, and combining them as
follows yields a Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 27. Let a set of players play a finite sequential game by converting their own
strategies lazily based on beliefs about the other players strategies in order to maximize an acyclic
preference relation. Then a Nash equilibrium can be obtained from the stable strategies they will
settle to as follows: Along the common path chosen by their stable strategies, everyone follows
their own strategy. In any subgame that is not reached, each player plays according to the beliefs
held by the player controlling access to the subgame about their strategies.
Proof. At any vertex reached during the final play, the choice facing the current player is the
same one she was anticipating due to her beliefs on her opponents strategies. As her choice is
consistent with the stable choice made during the dynamical updating, she has no incentive to
change.
In comparison, the investigation of the epistemic foundations of Nash equilibria by Aumann
and Brandenburger [3] identified mutual knowledge of rationality, knowledge of the game
and (in case of more than two players) a common prior as the prerequisite for playing a Nash
equilibrium. A subgame perfect equilibrium requires even stronger assumptions, namely well-
aware players [2].
1The notion has been corrected by Kamada later, but the difference is not present in the deterministic setting.
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6 Lazy improvement in infinite games
Infinite games in extensive form with win/lose preferences are generalizations of Gale-Stewart
games [9], and are of great relevance for logic. That any two-player game in extensive form with
antagonistic preferences and a Borel winning set actually has a Nash equilibrium is a highly non-
trivial result by Martin [22]. It was used by Mertens and Neymann [23] to show that infinite
games with finitely many players and bounded, Borel-measurable, non-necessarily antagonistic
real-valued payoffs have ǫ-Nash equilibria. It was generalized to infinitely many players and
payoffs only bounded from above in [17]. Moreover, subgame-perfect equilibria do not always
exist (cf. [18, 28]).
The definition of lazy improvement applies to infinite games in extensive form as well, and
we can adapt the results on finite games to see that it still constitutes a semi-potential:
Proposition 28. Consider an infinite game in extensive form where each player (there might
be infinitely many) has acyclic preferences. Then lazy improvement is a semi-potential.
Proof. As argued in Section 3, we only need to show that lazy improvement is acyclic. Assume
the contrary, then there is some finite cycle s1 ⇀ s2 ⇀ . . . ⇀ sn ⇀ s1. Any subtree of the game
tree not reached by any strategy profile si is irrelevant for the existence of the cycle, and could
thus be pruned. Doing so yields a finitely branching game tree, with still a lazy improvement
cycle.
Let p1, . . . , pn be the paths induced by the strategy profiles s1, . . . , sn, and choose k ∈ N
such that pi|≤k = pj |≤k ⇔ pi = pj . By choice of k, the path chosen inside any subgame
rooted at depth k remains unchanged throughout the improvement cycle. Thus, replacing any
such subgame with a leaf carrying the outcome induced by this path has no impact on the
improvement cycle. We have obtained a finite game in extensive form with the same preferences
and a cycle built from lazy improvement step, contradicting Theorem 11.
Of course, in an infinite game acyclicity does not suffice to ensure termination or even
convergence. In fact, [18, Example 26] (reproduced below as Example 51) shows that lazy
improvement in infinite games will not always converge, and that even accumulation points do
not have to be Nash equilibria. There are however several potential ways to extend the results
on lazy improvement to infinite games in extensive form:
1. We can consider games where the preferences are expressed via continuous payoff func-
tions. For some fixed ε > 0, we can then consider ε-lazy improvement (where only lazy
convertibility is allowed, and improvement steps are only taken if the player can improve
by more than ε). Then Theorems 11 and 18 carry over, and as a counterpart to Corol-
lary 10 we find that the terminal profiles of ε-lazy improvement are precisely the ε-Nash
equilibria. See Subsection 6.1.
2. Again for continuous payoff functions, we can employ lazy improvement being done in a
finitary way with increasing precision, and find that any accumulation point of particular
subsequence is guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium, see Subsection 6.2.
3. We define a notion of a fair lazy improvement sequence in Subsection 6.3. We then gen-
eralize the measure employed in the proof of Theorem 18 to infinite games with Lipschitz
payoff functions for fair improvement sequences. Moreover, we prove that for continuous
payoff functions, all accumulation points of a fair lazy improvement sequence with finitely
many accumulation points are Nash equilibria.
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4. Departing from the setting of continuous payoff functions, we can consider games where
the players have win/lose objectives (i.e. their preference relations have height 2), and the
winning sets are ∆02-sets. Then transfinite iteration of lazy improvement will reach a Nash
equilibrium, see Subsection 6.4.
In the following we always assume that the game tree is the full infinite binary tree, hence
the set of resulting plays is {0, 1}N. This space carries a natural topology induced by the metric
d(p, q) = 2−min{n|p(n)6=p(q)} for p 6= q, and in particular is a compact zero-dimensional space. In
the first three following subsections, we assume that the preferences of each player are given by
payoff functions fa : {0, 1}
N → R, where p ≺a q iff fa(p) < fa(q). We can then speak about
restrictions on the payoff functions such as being continuous or Lipschitz continuous.
6.1 ε-lazy improvement
Consider preferences obtained from payoff functions. Then for every ε > 0, we can intro-
duce ε-lazy improvement as the intersection of lazy convertibility and ε-improvement, where
ε-improvement means considering only those improvement steps where the payoff for the player
increases by more than ε. Consequently, an ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where no
player can improve by more than ε.
Observation 29. The sinks of ε-lazy improvement are precisely the ε-Nash equilibria.
Proposition 30. Let (sn)n∈N be a sequence of strategy profiles in an infinite binary game in
extensive form with sn
c
⇀ sn+1. Let Player a have a preference induced by a continuous payoff
function f , and assume that for some ε > 0, whenever sn
c
⇀a sn+1, with induced plays pn, pn+1,
then f(pn+1) > f(pn) + ε. Then sn
c
⇀a sn+1 holds for only finitely many n.
Proof. We will essentially use a reduction to the case for finite trees, and invoke Theorem 11.
We consider the cover (Ak := ]
ǫ(k−1)
2 ,
ǫ(k+1)
2 [)k∈Z of R. By continuity of f and compactness
of {0, 1}N, there is a bar, i.e. a finite prefix-free family (wi ∈ {0, 1}
∗)i≤N such that {0, 1}
N =⋃
i≤N wi{0, 1}
N, such that for every i there exists some ki with f [wi{0, 1}
N] ⊆ Aki . Now consider
the tree T with the wi as the leaves. Clearly any strategy profile sn restricts to some strategy
profile s′n on T , and moreover, if sn
c
⇀ sn+1, then s
′
n
c
⇀ s′n+1.
In the finite game played on T , let Player a have the preference wi ≺a wj iff ki < kj. Clearly,
this is an acyclic preference. For every other Player b, we just use the full preference wi ≺b wj
for every i, j. Whenever sn
c
⇀a sn+1, then s
′
n, s
′
n+1 must induce some wi, wj with ki < kj .
Thus, we do not loose any convertibility steps performed by Player a, and have an instance of
Theorem 11 which implies that a only converts finitely many times.
Corollary 31. If there are finitely many players, each with continuous payoff function, perform-
ing ε-lazy improvement in an infinite binary game in extensive form, then the process terminates
in finitely many steps.
6.2 Deepening lazy improvement
Let us now assume that all (countably many) Player a have preferences derived from continuous
payoff functions fa. For each Player a we can use fa to label every vertex v in the game with
some rational interval Iav in a way
2 that the label of every vertex is a subset of its predecessor,
2The idea behind this corresponds to the representation of real numbers in computable analysis [29].
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and such that
⋂
n∈N I
a
p≤n
= {fa(p)} , i.e. the intersection of all labels along an infinite path is
the singleton set containing the payoff for this path.
In the deepening lazy improvement dynamics, we start with some inspection depth d. The
players consider the prefix of the game tree of depth d, where Player a prefers some vertex v
(at depth d) to some vertex u (also at depth d) if all points in Iau are smaller than all points in
Iav . Now any lazy improvement step in this finite game (on the tree cut at depth d) induces an
improvement step in the infinite tree game. By Theorem 11, improvement in every such finite
game terminates.
Once all players are stable at the current inspection depth, the inspection depth is incre-
mented by one. The incrementing shall be counted as an updating step, where the strategy
profile is not modified. Thus some infinite sequence of strategy profile always arises. We shall
call the subsequence of the profiles right after the inspection depth is incremented the stable
subsequence.
Note that the choice of labeling system is not uniquely determined by the payoff function,
and that the labeling in turn influences the lazy improvement dynamics. Moreover, note that
while we are dealing with linear preferences only in the case of infinite games, we do make use of
finite approximations that lack linear preferences – yet we are guaranteed that every preference
occurring in our finite approximations is acyclic, which is sufficient for Theorem 11. Finally, the
dynamics do depend on the history – however, only on the depth currently reached, not on any
details.
Observation 32. The deepening lazy improvement dynamics are computable, i.e. given an
infinite binary game and an initial strategy profile, we can compute a sequence of strategy profiles
arising from deepening lazy improvement, as well as the indices of the stable subsequence.
Theorem 33. The following properties are equivalent for a strategy profile s:
1. s is a Nash equilibrium.
2. s is a fixed point3 for deepening lazy improvement.
3. s is an accumulation point of the stable subsequence of some sequence obtained from deep-
ening lazy improvement.
Proof. 1.⇔ 2. By continuity of the preferences, a player prefers a strategy profile s to another
profile s′, if and only if there is an inspection depth d such that he prefers the restriction
of s to the restriction of s′ in the corresponding finite approximation. This in turn implies
that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the infinite game, if and only if all its finite
prefixes are Nash equilibria in the corresponding finite games. The same holds for fixed
points by construction of the lazy improvement steps for infinite games. Thus, the claim
for infinite games follows from the result for finite games, i.e. Observation 4.
2.⇒ 3. If s is a fixed point, then the lazy improvement sequence with starting point s is constant,
hence has s as accumulation point.
3.⇒ 2. Let the strategy profile s arise as an accumulation point of the stable subsequence of
a sequence (sn)n∈N obtained by deepening lazy improvement, and assume that s is not
a fixed point. Then there is some minimal inspection depth d necessary to find a lazy
3Given the history dependence of the lazy improvement dynamics, a fixed point is understood to be any starting
point of a lazy improvement sequence resulting in a constant sequence, i.e. no improvement step is found at any
inspection depth.
16 Lazy improvement and Nash equilibrium
improvement step in s, which is executed by some Player a. The detection at inspection
depth d means that any strategy profile s′ sharing a finite prefix of depth d with s will
admit exactly the same lazy improvement step.
The assumption that s is an accumulation point of the stable subsequence in particular
implies that infinitely many strategy profiles occur that share a prefix of length d with s.
In particular, there would have to be a strategy profile that shares a prefix of length d
with s, and that is stable at inspection depth d′ > d. But, as explained above, Player a
would then wish to change his strategy, i.e. we have arrived at a contradiction. Hence, s
has to be a fixed point.
6.3 Fair Lazy improvement
The third approach is based on what we call fair lazy improvement, and it is closely related
to the outcomes’ being real-valued payoff tuples. An infinite improvement sequence is fair if
the following holds: every player who could improve her payoff by more than some given value
infinitely often also makes such an improvement infinitely often. This condition rules out two
undesirable cases: First, a player keeps improving towards some lower payoff, while a larger
payoff has been available all along; second, a player never gets the chance to improve at all,
while she could improve significantly. The formal definition follows:
Definition 34 (Fair improvement4). Consider a game with real-valued payoff functions (fa)a∈A.
A lazy improvement sequence (sn)n∈N is fair if the following holds: for all positive real numbers
r and all players a ∈ A, if for all n there are m > n and a strategy profile s′ such that sm ⇀a s
′
and fa(sm) + r < fa(s
′), then sn ⇀a sn+1 and fa(sn) + r < fa(sn+1) for infinitely many n.
As of now we are unable to answer the following question.
Open question 35. In an infinite binary game with continuous real-valued payoff functions,
are all accumulation points of a fair lazy improvement sequence Nash equilibria?
We will show that the answer is positive in two special cases. First, if the sequence has
only finitely many accumulation points, we can use the lazy non-worsening we introduced in
Subsection 4.3 together with a limit argument to establish the following.
Theorem 36. If a fair lazy improvement sequence (sn)n∈N in a binary game with continuous
payoff functions has only finitely many accumulation points, then all of them are Nash equilibria.
Proof. As there are only finitely many accumulation points of (sn)n∈N, there are only finitely
many positions in the game tree where the current choice changes infinitely many times. Let
d0 ∈ N be large enough that no such position occurs below depth d0 in the game tree. For any
vertex v below depth d0, the sequence of payoffs induced by sn starting from v will converge.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that (sn)n∈N has some accumulation point s which is
not a Nash equilibrium. By continuity of the payoff functions, there is some d1 ≥ d0, a Player
a and some δ > 0 such that infinitely many sn coincide with s at least up to depth d1, that any
two paths agreeing up to depth d1 grant Player a payoffs differing by less than δ, and moreover,
that in any strategy profile coinciding with s up to depth d1, Player a has a lazy improvement
step of at least δ available.
4This is fair as in fair scheduler, not as in fair division of cake.
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Let gn be the finite game of depth d1 where each leaf has the same payoff as the subgame
starting at the corresponding vertex in the original game would yield using the strategy profile
sn, and let s
′
n be the corresponding truncation of sn. Let g be the limit of the gn. We have
either s′n = s
′
n+1, or s
′
n ⇀ s
′
n+1 in gn. We can safely remove duplicates from the sequence. By
Lemma 25 we find that s′n ⇀ ∪ s
′
n+1 in g, and then Theorem 22 implies that each player (in
particular Player a) makes only finitely many improvement steps in the sequence (s′n)n∈N. Now
any improvement step by Player a in (sn)n∈N by more than δ corresponds to an improvement
step in the (s′n)n∈N, hence he makes only finitely many of those. This contradicts the fairness
of (sn)n∈N.
Covering the case of only finitely many accumulation points does not suffice in general, as
there can be uncountably many, as we shall proceed to show.
Proposition 37. Let A ⊆ {0, 1}N be a non-empty closed set with empty interior. Then there
is a one player game with a continuous payoff function, and a fair lazy improvement sequence
(sn)n∈N, such that A is the set of runs induced by the accumulation points of (sn)n∈N.
Proof. We will use the payoff function p 7→ (1 − d(p,A)) for the player. As a closed subset
of Cantor space, A can be represented as the set of infinite path through some pruned tree
TA ⊆ {0, 1}
∗. As A has empty interior, we know that for any v ∈ TA there is some extension
w ⊒ v with w /∈ TA. By iteratively applying this to children, we find that for all v ∈ TA and
k > |v|, there is some wv,k ⊒ v with wv,k /∈ TA, |wv,k| ≥ k, and the longest proper prefix of wv,k
is in TA.
Let TA = {vn | n ∈ N}. We now construct a sequence of paths (pn)n∈N iteratively, together
with an auxiliary sequence (kn)n∈N of integers. Let k0 := 0, and p0 be some path extending
wv0,0. Then let us always choose kn+1 such that d(pn, A) > 2
−kn+1+1, and pn+1 to be some path
extending wvn+1,kn+1 .
This construction ensures that d(pm, A) converges monotonely to 0. We derive a sequence
(sm)m∈N of strategy profiles linked via lazy convertibility, such that sm induces pm. Then
(sm)m∈N is a fair lazy improvement sequence. It remains for us to argue that A is the set of
accumulation points of (pn)n∈N. Some open ball v{0, 1}
N intersects A iff v ∈ TA. Since any such
v has infinitely many extensions v′ also in TA, we see that there are infinitely many pn with prefix
v. Thus, any p ∈ A is an accumulation point of (pn)n∈N. Moreover, since limn→∞ d(pn, A) = 0,
(pn)n∈N cannot have any accumulation points outside of A.
Corollary 38. There are fair lazy improvement sequences with uncountably many accumulation
points.
We can extend the argument based on a measure employed in the proof of Theorem 18 to
the infinite case, provided that the payoff functions satisfy a rather strong Lipschitz condition.
This conditions is used to ensure that (a modification of) the measure is a finite quantity.
Proposition 39. If the game tree is binary and if for each player there exists η > 2 such that
her payoff function is Lipschitz-continuous for the distance d defined by d(h0ρ, h1ρ′) = 1
η|h|
, then
all the accumulation points of a fair lazy improvement sequence are Nash equilibria.
Proof. To all strategy profiles s and all players a let us associate a real number:
Ma(s) :=
∑
h∈d−1(a)
fa
(
h · (1− s(h)) · ρ(h · (1− s(h)), s)
)
− min
ρ∈{0,1}ω
(fa(hρ))
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where d(h) is the player that plays at history h, and fa(ρ) is the payoff for Player a and run ρ,
and s(h) is the choice in {0, 1} that is prescribed by s at h, and ρ(h, s) is the run induced by
strategy profile s from h on. Similarly to the finite case fa(h · (1−s(h)) ·ρ(h · (1−s(h)), s)) is the
payoff that is avoided by a at history h. Note that the summands of Ma(s) are all non-negative
by definition of the minimum, and that the sum converges absolutely: indeed, by assumption
|fa(h0ρ)− fa(h1ρ
′)| ≤ La
η|h|
for some La > 0 and for all h, ρ, and ρ
′, so Ma(s) ≤
∑
h∈{0,1}∗
La
η|h|
=
La
∑+∞
l=0 (
2
η
)l = La
1− 2
η
. Also, each Ma is continuous.
Similarly to the finite case, it is easy to see that Ma is left unchanged when another player
performs a lazy convertibility step. Also, Ma decreases by δ when Player a performs a lazy
convertibility step that improves her payoff by δ ∈ R: first prove the claim for convertibility
step changing only one choice (at one node); then by induction the claim holds for finitely many
changes; finally, the full claim holds by continuity of Ma. As Ma is non-negative, it follows that
for all δ > 0, in all lazy improvement sequences, no player can infinitely often improve by more
than δ.
Assume that (sn)n∈N is a lazy improvements sequence, and let s be some accumulation point
that is not an Nash equilibrium. So s ⇀a t for some profile t and Player a. By continuity of the
payoffs there are δ, ε > 0 such that whenever d(s, s′) < δ, there is some t′ such that s′ ⇀a t
′,
and the payoff for a in t′ exceeds her payoff in s′ by at least δ.
Now if (sn)n∈N were fair, then a would need to improve by at least δ infinitely often, contra-
dicting our observation above.
6.4 Transfinite lazy improvement in the difference hierarchy
We start by formalizing what it means to do a transfinite number of improvement steps. The
following definition generalises the notion of finite sequence or ω-sequence induced by a binary
relation to α-sequence for some ordinal α: at limit ordinals, following a valid sequence amounts
to picking an ”accumulation point”.
Definition 40 (ordinal sequence of a relation). Let → be a binary relation on some topological
space S, and let α be an ordinal number. An α-sequence of → is a family (sβ)β<α of elements
in S such that for all β < α, if β + 1 < α then sβ → sβ+1, and if β is a limit ordinal, then for
every β′ < β and every neighborhood U of sβ there exists γ ∈]β
′, β[ such that sγ ∈ U .
Lemma 41 below says that, given a binary relation over a compact set, the only reason why
an ordinal sequence cannot be further extended is when a sink has been reached.
Lemma 41. Let (sβ)β<α be a countable ordinal sequence of → over a compact set S. If (sβ)β≤α
is not a sequence of → for any sα ∈ S, then α = α
′ + 1 for some α′ and sα′ is a sink of →.
Proof. Let α be a limit ordinal. Towards a contradiction let us assume that (sβ)β<α is not
extendable. So for all s ∈ S there exist a neighborhood Us of s and an ordinal βs < α such that
sγ /∈ Us for all γ > βs. The {Us}s∈S form an open cover of S, so by compactness of S there
exists a finite subcover {Us}s∈S′ . Let γ := sups∈S′ βs+1. So γ < α by finiteness of S
′. Moreover
sγ /∈ Us for all s ∈ S
′, so sγ /∈ ∪s∈S′Us ⊇ S, contradiction.
In this paper by countable we mean at most countable. We find that even in very simple
games, we can have improvement sequences of any countable length.
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Proposition 42. For every countable ordinal α there exists a win-lose two-player game on a
binary tree with open winning set for one player, and an α-sequence of lazy improvement in the
game.
Proof. By transfinite induction on α. It holds for the case α = 0 (take the empty set as winning
set). For the inductive case let us make a further case disjunction: first case, α = α′ + 1 is not
a limit ordinal. Let (sβ)β<α′ be an α
′-sequence on some game g with open winning set. Let
X be the opponent of the player who wins according to sα′ . Let us consider the supergame
where X chooses between playing in g or winning directly. This leads to an (α′ + 1)-sequence.
Second case, α is a limit ordinal. Since it is countable, there exists a sequence (βi)i∈N such that
1 < βi < α for all i and α = supi∈N βi. Since α is a limit ordinal, βi + 1 < α for all i, so by
induction hypothesis let gi be a game with open winning set for a, and that has a βi+1-sequence
with starting profile si. Since ignoring the first profile of the sequence does not change its order
type, we can further assume that si makes a lose. Now let us define a supergame by giving
Player a the possibility to continue forever and lose, or stop at stage i and play in gi. The
winning set of a is a union of open sets and is therefore open. Let us build an α-sequence as
follows. Let us start with a profile where si is the subprofile in gi for all i, and where a chooses
to play g0 at the root of the supergame. Let the players change strategies in g0 until b wins for
the last time in the β0 + 1-sequence, then let a change games to g1 and simultaneously perform
the first change from s1 in g1. Then let the players change strategies in g1 until b wins for the
last time in the β1 + 1-sequence, and so on.
Lemma 43 below uses the main proof technique in this section: from a putative uncountable
ordinal sequence of lazy improvement, we can extract an uncountable factor (or substring) with
more properties.
Lemma 43. Let g be a game on a binary tree, where some open set X contains only worst runs
for some Player a. If there exists an uncountable sequence of lazy improvement in g, it has an
uncountable subsequence where improvements from Player a do not involve runs in X.
Proof. Since there is an uncountable sequence of lazy improvement in g, there is a ω1-sequence,
where ω1 is the first uncountable ordinal. Since there are only countably many vertices in the
game, and since X is open and non-empty, it can be written ∪i∈Nui{0, 1}
ω where all ui ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
If Player a avoids some ui{0, 1}
ω at some point in the ω1-sequence, it avoids it for ever, since it is
open and since it contains only worst possible runs. So Player a escaping X by an improvement
step only occurs countably many times in the ω1-sequence. Let Γ be the set of ordinals where
such improvements occur. So, such improvements do not occur from (supΓ) + 1 (a countable
ordinal) to ω1. This truncated sequence witnesses the claim.
Lemma 44 below is the base case of the proof of Theorem 47, which is proved by transfinite
induction.
Lemma 44. Let g be a game with finitely many players who have Boolean (i.e. win/lose)
objectives. If every winning set is open or closed, every sequence of lazy improvement in g is
countable.
Proof. By induction on the number of outcome tuples occurring in the game. The claim holds for
one tuple, so let us assume that at least two tuples occur in the game. Towards a contradiction,
let us consider an uncountable sequence of lazy improvement in g. Let us assume that the losing
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set of some Player a has non-empty interior X. By applying Lemma 43 there is an uncountable
subsequence where improvements from Player a do not involve runs in X. So the above sequence
is still valid in the game derived from g by moving X from the losing set of Player a to her
winning set. Applying this to each player yields a game g′ where the losing sets are all closed
with empty interiors and where there is a ω1-sequence of lazy improvement.
Let A be the set of the players occurring in the game and for all a ∈ A let Wa be the winning
set of a in g′. Let A′ have maximal cardinality under the constraint ∩a∈A′Wa 6= ∅, so all runs in
∩a∈A′Wa make all players in A\A
′ 6= ∅ lose. Since ∩a∈A′Wa is open and non-empty, {0, 1}
ω\Wa
has non-empty interior for all a ∈ A\A′, which implies that A′ = A to avoid a contradiction.
So, the ω1-sequence of lazy improvement does not visit ∩a∈A′Wa (because nobody would want
to leave it), which induces an uncountable sequence with fewer tuples and allows us to conclude
by IH.
Lemma 45 below will be useful during the transfinite induction step, when proving Theo-
rem 47.
Lemma 45. Let g be a game, let a be a player with Boolean objectives, let u be a node of the
game, let gu be the subgame of g rooted at u, and for all profiles s in g let su be the corresponding
profile in gu. Consider a lazy improvement sequence in g. For all steps s ⇀a s
′ in the sequence
(but possibly the first one entering gu), either s
′
u = su or su ⇀a s
′
u in gu.
Proof. If the induced play does not reach u after the improvement step s ⇀a s
′, then s′u = su.
So let us assume it reaches u afterwards. If it also reaches u before, su ⇀a s
′
u, so let us assume it
does not. Let us assume that some earlier profile induced a play that reached u. Since Player a
is coming back to u, it must be her who left it. In particular, the outcome induced by s′u makes
player lose her objective, so su ⇀a s
′
u.
Example 46. In the following example, the numbers denote the payoffs for Player a. Player b
may be assumed to be antagonistic to a. We depict a lazy improvement sequence such that its
projection to the left subtree is not a lazy improvement sequence – in fact, the payoff is decreasing
for the acting Player a. This shows that the restriction to boolean outcomes in Lemma 45 is not
dispensable.
a
a
1 2
b
0 4
a
a
1 2
b
0 4
a
a
1 2
b
0 4
a
a
1 2
b
0 4
We recall from descriptive set theory (a standard reference is [12]) that a subset S of a metric
space is called a ∆02-set, if it is expressible both as S =
⋂
i∈N Ui with open Ui, and as S =
⋃
i∈NAi
with closed Ai. By the Hausdorff-Kuratowski theorem, the ∆
0
2-subsets of C
ω are exactly those
in the difference hierarchy. The difference hierarchy can be defined as follows: D0 = {∅}. For
some countable ordinal α > 0, Dα contains all sets of the form ∪i∈I(uiC
ω\Ai) where the ui ∈ C
∗
are prefix independent, and each Ai appears in some Dβ with β < α. That this indeed defines
the difference hierarchy was observed by Motto-Ros [26, Section 7] extending previous work
by Andretta and Martin [1]. A direct proof can be found in [20].
Theorem 47. Let g be a game with finitely many players who have Boolean objectives. If every
winning set is ∆02, every sequence of lazy improvement in g is countable.
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Proof. Let us proceed by transfinite induction on (the tuple of) the levels in the Hausdorff
difference hierarchy of the winning sets Wa of the players a ∈ A. The claim holds when the Wa
are open or closed by Lemma 44, so let us assume that some Wa is neither open nor closed.
Wa can be written ∪i∈I(uiC
ω \ Ai), where the ui are not prefixes of one another, where I is
countable since there are countably many vertices, and where each Ai lies in some lower level of
the difference hierarchy than Wa.
Towards a contradiction, let us assume that there is a ω1-sequence of lazy improvement in
g. By Lemma 45 this induces sequences of equalities or lazy improvements in the subgame gi
rooted at ui in g. Let Γi be the set of ordinals where improvement occurs in gi. The induction
hypothesis implies that Γi is countable. Let Γ
′ be the set of the ordinals where some gi is reached
for the first time. Then also γ := (supΓ′ ∪
⋃
i∈N Γi) + 1 is countable. In the truncated sequence
from γ to ω1, the induced profiles in all gi are constant. Let the ti be the corresponding Boolean
tuples, and let g′ be derived from g by fixing the outcome tuple ti all over gi, for all i. In g
′ the
winning set of a is open because it is a union of some of the uiC
ω, and the winning sets of the
other players did not increase in complexity. So, by IH every sequence of lazy improvement in
g′ is countable, contradiction.
Corollary 48. Let g be a game with finite branching and finitely many players who have Boolean
objectives. If every winning set is ∆02, every sequence of lazy improvement in g is countable and
ends at a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 47 and Lemma 41, since finite branching implies compactness.
Regarding a potential extension of Corollary 48 to winning sets beyond ∆02 we shall make
a tangential remark: The computational task of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player
game in extensive form with ∆02 winning sets is just as hard as iterating the task of finding
an accumulation point of a sequence over some countable ordinal. This follows from results in
[20, 19, 25, 5]. Finding a Nash equilibrium of a game with Σ02 winning sets is strictly more
complicated. Thus, ∆02 seems to be a natural boundary for results of the form of Corollary 48.
7 Some counterexamples
In order to obtain the termination result in the finite case (Theorem 11), some restriction on
how players can improve is indeed necessary. We shall show below that the better-response
dynamics ։ may fail to terminate even for very simple games in extensive form:
Example 49. An improvement cycle:
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
b
1, 0 0, 1
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
b
1, 0 0, 1
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
b
1, 0 0, 1
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
b
1, 0 0, 1
The technical notion of strategy that is used in this article to represent the intuitive concept
of a strategy (in games in extensive form) is not the only possible notion. An alternative notion
does not require choices from a player at every node that she owns, but only at nodes that
are not ruled out by the strategy of the same player. The three objects in Example 50 are
such minimalist, alternative strategy profiles, where double lines still represent choices. Up to
symmetry, they constitute from left to right a cycle of improvements that could be intuitively
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described as lazy, so an actual cycle of length eight can easily be inferred from the short pseudo
cycle. This may happen because, although the improvements may look lazy, Player a forgets
about her choices in a subgame (of the root) when leaving it, and may settle for different
choices when coming back to the subgame. This suggests that even counter-factual choices are
sometimes relevant. In particular, this means that lazy improvement is not a natural dynamics
in the sense of Hart [10]; or a simple model in the sense of Roth and Erev [27].
Example 50. Let W be winning for Player a and L be losing; and vice versa for Player b.
a
b
a
W L
a
W L
b
a
W L
a
W L
a
b
a
W L
a
W L
b
a
W L
a
W L
a
b
a
W L
a
W L
b
a
W L
a
W L
The example below shows that for infinite games, a sequence of lazy improvement steps may
have multiple accumulation points even for continuous payoff functions; and moreover, that not
all accumulation points have to be Nash equilibria.
Example 51 ([18, Example 26]).
c
α0, β0, γ0, δ0 d
α1, β1, γ1, δ1 c
αn, βn, γn, δn
α, β, γ, δ
Let us consider games with four players a,
b, c, and d. Given four real-valued sequences
A = (αn)n∈N, B = (βn)n∈N, C = (γn)n∈N, and
D = (δn)n∈N converging towards α, β, γ, and
δ, let T (A,B, C,D) be the following game and
strategy profile. Note that apart from the pay-
offs, the underlying game effectively involves
players c and d only. If C and D are increasing,
the lazy improvement dynamics sees players c
and d alternating in switching their top left-
move to a right-move.
Let A := B := (1 + 1
n+1)n∈N and let C := D := (1 −
1
n+1)n∈N. Starting from the profile
below, players c and d will continue to unravel the subgame currently chosen jointly by a and b.
Player b will keep alternating her choices to pick the least-unraveled subgame available to her.
Player a will prefer to chose a subgame where Player b currently chooses right, and also prefers
less-unraveled subgames.
a
b
T (A,B, C,D) T (1 +A,B, C,D)
b
T (A,B, C,D) T (1 +A,B, C,D)
First of all, already the subgame where b moves first demonstrates that the lazy improvement
dynamics will not always converge, hence we have to consider accumulation points rather than
limit points. For the next feature, note that there is an infinite sequence of lazy improvement
where players a and b (at both nodes that she owns) switch infinitely often, and where Player
a switches only when Player b chooses the right subgame (on the induced play). Then the
following strategy profile is an accumulation point, but it is clearly not a Nash equilibrium.
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a
b
1, 1, 1, 1 2, 1, 1, 1
b
1, 1, 1, 1 2, 1, 1, 1
In our current model the players perform lazy improvement updates in a sequential manner.
If simultaneity were allowed (yet not compulsory), cycles could occur, as shown in the example
below.
Example 52. It is a cycle up to symmetry only, a proper cycle of length 4 may be easily derived
from it.
a
b
a
3, 2 2, 0
1, 1
b
1, 1 a
2, 0 3, 2
a
b
a
3, 2 2, 0
1, 1
b
1, 1 a
2, 0 3, 2
a
b
a
3, 2 2, 0
1, 1
b
1, 1 a
2, 0 3, 2
This behaviour can be avoided by considering lazy best-response dynamics, rather than
merely lazy better-response. In the sequential case, clearly the termination of the latter implies
termination of the former. In the simultaneous case we find the following.
Proposition 53. The synchronous lazy best-response sequences in a game with n internal nodes
have length at most 2n, provided that the players have acyclic preferences.
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim for preferences that are linear orders, which we prove by
induction on the number of internal nodes of the game g. (It holds for zero.) Let v be an
internal node in g whose children are all leaves, let a be the owner of v, and let us consider a
sequence where a always chooses the same outcome x at v. Let g′ be the game derived from g by
replacing v with a leaf enclosing the outcome x. The synchronous lazy best-response sequence in
g corresponds, by restriction of the profiles, to a sequence in g′, so it has length at most 2n−1 by
I.H. Now let us consider an arbitrary sequence, and note that a can change choices only once at
v, from some non-preferred outcome to her preferred one (among the outcomes occurring below
v). So the length of a sequence in g is at most 2n−1 + 2n−1 = 2n.
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